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Manufacturing Export, Infrastructure
and Institutions: Reflections from ECOWAS
Uchenna R. Efobi and Evans S. Osabuohien
Abstract This study examines the extent of manufacturing export in ECOWAS
countries, how it has been affected by the extent of infrastructural development and
the distilling role of institutions. In retrospect, we present stylized facts that proves
that ECOWAS poor infrastructural development has largely being driven by the
poor institutions, which promotes private benefits rather than public good (such as
infrastructure). In essence, this has hampered manufacturing export and reduced the
extent of competitiveness of these countries.
Keywords ECOWAS • Infrastructural provision • Institutions • Manufacturing
export • Manufacturing value added
JEL Classification F13 • F31
1 Introduction
The main focus of this paper is to examine the role of institutions in underscoring
the linkage between infrastructures and manufacturing export in countries in the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The manufacturing sector plays a vital role in enhancing countries’ global
competitiveness and the extent of their internationalisation drive. This includes
their ability to adequately provide goods and services that are able to compete
effectively in the international market, where demand is mostly based on the quality
and efficiency of the products being sold. This has brought about the reiteration that
countries in Africa should pay more attention to improving the manufacturing
sector, unlike the traditional export baskets that include the composition of primary
U.R. Efobi (*)
Department of Accounting, School of Business, College of Development Studies, Covenant
University, KM 10, Idiroko Road, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria
e-mail: efobi99@yahoo.co.uk; uche.efobi@covenantuniversity.edu.ng
E.S. Osabuohien
Department of Economics and Development Studies, Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria
German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany
e-mail: pecos4eva@gmail.com; stephen.osabuohien@covenantuniversity.edu.ng
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
D. Seck (ed.), Accelerated Economic Growth in West Africa, Advances in African
Economic, Social and Political Development, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-16826-5_8
157
pecos4eva@gmail.com
products like those from the agriculture or natural resource. The address by the
World Bank’s president in 2014 clearly states that the hope of African countries
should focus on developing the light manufacturing sector, which could help in the
development of industrialization, export diversification, and job creation (Kim
2014). Kim also stated that recent analysis suggest that the development of this
sector could create about seven million new jobs in the continent and the drastic
effect on a continent that currently faces unemployment situation, is immeasurable.
The issues relating to the development of the manufacturing sector cannot be
discussed in isolation. There are catalysts to this development, called infrastructure.
Infrastructure encompasses those physical components or structures that is needed
to enhance the operation of a particular process in a society. With regard to the
manufacturing sector, infrastructure plays two important roles: the enhancement of
the input and the output process in a production system. With regards to the input
process, infrastructure enhances the procurement of material input and also in the
preservation of these inputs. The output processes involve the use of infrastructure
in preserving, securing and transporting the finished products to the potential
market.
The cost of poor infrastructural development is seen in the increased cost of
trading, in the form of production and transportation cost (Limao and Venables
2001; Abe and Wilson 2009). For instance, the recent industrial migration from
Nigeria to neighbouring countries—like Ghana—was attributed to increased cost of
production due to poor power supply and port congestions that consequently
resulted to increased overhead cost of production of manufacturing companies
(Sunday Trust 2013). Likewise, industries in most of these countries (African
countries) experience increased trade cost on transportation of raw materials and
finished goods, as a result of poor infrastructural facilities (World Bank 2013).
Actually, poor infrastructural development in African countries (including
ECOWAS countries) is one of the main impediment to trade development. This
cannot be denied seeing the Statistics that shows that limited road access in Africa
reaches only about 34 % of the rural community, compared to the 90 % for the rest
of the world (African Development Bank-ADB 2010a). Likewise, less than 40 % of
the region’s population have access to electricity and about one-third, living in rural
areas, are within 2 km of an all-season road, compared to two-thirds of the
population in other regions (ADB 2010b; Obilomo and Ojo 2013).
The World Bank (2013) predicted that for African countries to be effectively
competitive in the global sphere, there is the need for an annual investment of about
US$93 billion until 2020 for infrastructural development. Noting this prediction,
most African countries have resorted to the consideration of increased inflow of
Foreign Direct investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to
offset the huge infrastructural deficit. It is no wonder that across Africa, over 70 %
of the public funding comes from foreign aid (Moyo 2009); Asiedu (2006) earlier
confirmed that the need for African countries to attract FDI in order to fill their
resource gap is needed for development projects. The inflow of these forms of
capital is not without a cost. Apart from the fact that the continent has experienced
increased poverty and institutional breakdown as a result of these funds (Moyo
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2009), the uncertainty of these funds is another encumbrance to their reliance for
developmental projects (African Economic Outlook 2014).
In the light of these, the quality of institutions and governance structure is
considered as a sustainable alternative. In essence, we argue that African countries
can begin to play less on depending on foreign resource for financing their infra-
structural deficit, by improving their institutional and governance structure to
effectively manage funds and reserves to aid this. This argument stems from the
fact that African countries experience huge resource leakages from fund outflow
that is predicated on poor institutions. For instance, in 2002, the African Union
estimated the annual cost of corruption on the continent to be US$150 billion.1
Putting this in perspective, African countries will experience a windfall from public
resources (in the form of channelling these funds to development projects like
infrastructural development) if institutions are developed and the governance
structure is enhanced.
The theoretical justification for this argumentation is intense, as proponents of
institutional economics (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001; Blair-Henry and Miller 2008;
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Osabuohien and Efobi 2013; Efobi 2015), have
argued that the distinguishing factors between countries—in the global sphere—is
the strength of their institutions and policies. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
portrays a compelling discuss by noting that institutions are political forces that
creates incentives for government and politicians and determines the quality of
policies that are put forward by them. Sometimes, these forces are either overt or
explicit, but the common peculiarity is that these rules—no matter the form—
structure social interactions (Hodgson 2006). Some other contributors to the liter-
ature on institutional economics include North (1990, 1991) and a host of others
like Osabuohien and Efobi (2013), Asongu (2014). Putting this in perspective, we
suspect that the reason why African countries—ECOWAS inclusive—have not
recorded much progress in infrastructural development that would have hitherto
enhanced growth is because of the poor institutional forces that exist in these
countries. Analogically, political actors in these countries would have had incentive
to pursue the development of infrastructure for trade facilitation if only the extent of
institutional development was emphasised.
Noting this, policy analysts have consistently presented a wake-up call for the
strengthening of the institutional framework of African countries to pursue
improved infrastructural development. For instance, in the ECOWAS region, the
regional community is beginning to emphasise the need for regional actions that
will propel member states to put in place policies to enhance infrastructural
development. Some of these actions include the Supplementary Act of 2007 that
focused on the harmonisation of policies and regulatory framework for the
1Considering that African countries’ average inflation rate of 7.08 for 2003–2010 (according to the
United Nations Statistics, available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/
wesp_archive/2012annex_tables.pdf), then the value for US$150 billion in 2010 would be about
US$1 trillion, which is over 11 times more than the annual contribution required for infrastructural
development.
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development of soft (ICT) infrastructure in the sub-region. Article 33 of the Act
provides that member states should participate in the modernisation and develop-
ment of infrastructure in order to provide reliable interconnectedness, both for
regional and international communication (ECOWAS 2007). Among the notable
achievements of this effort is the declaration for the support of the deployment of
submarine cable project that links member countries to Southern Europe
(Osabouhien and Efobi 2014).
It is on this note that this study intends to empirically examine the linkage
between institutional development and its effect on infrastructure and manufactur-
ing export in African countries—especially ECOWAS countries—to be precise.
The main reason for focusing on ECOWAS countries is highlighted in the subse-
quent section (stylized trend) of this paper. The remainder of the paper is organised
as follows: Sect. 2 presents discuss from the empirical literature, while Sect. 3
provides some stylized facts. In Sect. 4 we present some bi (and multivariate)
relationships between the three elements of study. Section 5 concludes with policy
implications.
2 Insights from Literature
It is advantageous for countries to begin to focus on the improvement of the
productivity of their manufacturing sector. This is especially when countries are
beginning to think towards enhancing their global competitiveness. In Africa, this
cannot be overemphasised due to the fact that there has been an over reliance on
primary product by most of the countries in this region. In a policy document by the
United Nations Economic Commission of Africa-UNECA (2013), the need for the
development of the manufacturing sector of African countries was tied to the fact
that the productivity gains that emanates from the linkages (backward and forward)
between the manufacturing sectors and other sectors gives rise to increased scope
for technology transfer and diffusion, and improved managerial and technological
spill-overs. Generally, the manufacturing sector has also been known to be an
economic growth enhancer through its functional role in capital accumulation,
knowledge and managerial skills transfer, increasing economies of scale and
learning by doing effects.2
The literature on the relevance of infrastructural development on trade is rather
much with reiterating stances cutting across regions. For instance, the Asian’s
region trade expansion was in turn facilitated and encouraged by the development
of supporting infrastructure including physical and institutional infrastructure
(Douglas and Jayant 2005). This massive investment in infrastructure for trade
facilitation was facilitated by the structural reforms in this region that was targeted
2 For more discussion on the importance of the manufacturing sector, see Mbate (2014), who
examined industrial policy and structural changes in ECOWAS countries.
160 U.R. Efobi and E.S. Osabuohien
pecos4eva@gmail.com
at improving the environment for investment, production and trade. In essence,
countries within the region understood that the duo (infrastructure and trade) are
complimentary in themselves, although there is still the need to boost infrastruc-
tural provision in this region.
In an earlier study on European countries’ trade performance, the conclusion was
reached that infrastructural availability drastically affected transport cost of trade
(Bougheas et al. 1999). Their theoretical model predicts that for pairs of countries
for which investment in infrastructure is optimal, a positive relationship between
the level of infrastructure and the volume of trade is predictive. Focusing on Africa,
Tomasz and Colin (2009) estimated a standard gravity model with particular
reference to Africa: they concluded that trade facilitation—in the form of improved
quality of the basic transport and communications infrastructure—improves export
performance in Africa. Somewhat similar conclusion was reached on a global
perspective by Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2012) that the marginal effect of the
transport efficiency on exports appears to be decreasing with per capita income. In
contrast, they emphasise that the impact of physical infrastructure on exports
appears increasingly important for richer countries.
It is not surprising that infrastructure services plays a significant role in trade
costs by reducing distribution margins, lowering prices and raising consumer
welfare; more so, infrastructural provisions increases the profitability for
exporters—by lowering transaction costs and value addition to the production
process—while expanding linkages to the global distribution networks (Douglas
2005, 2008).
Of course, the influence between trade and infrastructure is expected as Nordas
and Piermartini (2004) clearly highlights four possible interactions that stems from
the relationship. The first is the direct monetary outlays, which covers the charges
for infrastructural services. As expected, in countries with poor infrastructural
service, this outlay becomes higher and even increases the overhead cost for the
benefit from such services. Timeliness of delivery of goods and services is another
outcome that is influenced by infrastructural services. The third is risk of damages,
losses and higher insurance cost on goods produced, while poormarket access is the
fourth issue caused by poor infrastructure.
Noting the relevance of infrastructure on trade, it is therefore puzzling on why
countries do not pay much attention to the development of this social good. In
understanding these reasons, it is important to address this issue from the institu-
tional perspective. The reason for this approach is because institutions are supposed
to be a form of framework that creates incentives for public officers to consider
efficient actions for the overall good of the society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012;
Efobi 2015; Asongu 2014). These actions are in the form of policies that pertains to
the overall progress of the society (Blair-Henry and Miller 2008). Therefore, it is
prudent to assume that states that do not experience considerable progress in
infrastructural development are lacking in the development of efficient institutions
to drive these progress. Francois and Manchin (2007) seem to support this
suspicion.
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Likewise, recent study by Cissokho et al. (2013) further buttress this stance,
noting that for West African countries to maximize their agricultural export, they
need to engage in investments in better infrastructure and institutional frameworks
in the form of faster customs clearance and fewer police payoffs at the borders.
Cissokho et al.’s study is the closest to this current study. They emphasized the role
of institutions and supplemented their recommendation based on an interview
carried out at two borders (Dakar-Kayes and Dakar-Bissau). Their submissions
calls for the need for further investigation on the linkage between institutions,
infrastructure and trade.
Also, a more compelling literature on the role of institutions on trade is emerg-
ing. Proponents of this debate have examined this linkage in diverse perspectives.
Some have concluded that there is a strong relationship between investment in
productivity (which affects country’s trade performance) and the quality of insti-
tutions (Knack and Keffer 1995; Mauro 1995; Rodrik 1995; Brunetti and Weder
1998). On another perspective, some authors noted that weak institutional frame-
work actually affects productivity by either reducing aggregate productivity or
slowing productivity growth (Hall and Jones 1999; Olson et al 2000). Yet from
another perspective, poor institution is accused for a country’s poor integration in
the international market because poor institutions can hurt a country’s capacity to
export manufactured goods (Meon and Sekkat 2008; Osabuohien and Efobi 2011).
With these compelling arguments, this current study considers the role of
institutions in determining the extent of provision of public infrastructure for
enhanced trade. This perspective is germane considering that poor institutional
framework creates a disincentive for public officers to act accordingly for state
interest. In essence, this is not about creating rules to guide behaviors of economic
agents but that the emphasis should be on the rules. Thus, the behaviors of
individual are only guided by the rules and not any form of informalities like
norms and accepted ways of behaviors prevalent in a particular system (World
Bank 1997). Putting this in context, the rising trend of poor institutions in a country
will give rise to the erosion of governmental legitimacy and consequently hampers
the effective delivery of public goods and services (Lawal 2007). This has been
empathetically reemphasized in the case of African countries (e.g. Asiedu 2006;
Asiedu and Lien 2011; Fosu 2011; Osabuohien and Efobi 2013; Efobi 2015).
3 Stylized Trends: Manufacturing Sector,3 Infrastructure
and Institutions
To understand the performance of the manufacturing exports of African countries
(especially ECOWAS countries), this study first of all observes the performance of
the manufacturing sector. The main indicator in achieving this is the manufacturing
3Emphasis was on the extent of productivity and export of the manufacturing sector.
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value added, which explains the net output of industries in a particular country after
adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs (World Bank 2014).
Obviously, the manufacturing sector in many of African countries have experi-
enced an undulating growth rate, as displayed in Fig. 1. However, this direction of
flow is not peculiar to African countries, as the trend for world average was not
stable as well. However, there is a need to appreciate the manufacturing sector
growth rate of African countries, noting that apart from the earlier period prior to
the financial crisis and during the crisis, these countries have exhibited a stable
rising of the productivity of this sector. For instance, in the ECOWAS region, the
manufacturing sector witnessed a consistent rising trend from 2008 onward from
1.38 % to about 6.30 % in 2012. Similar trend was displayed for SSA countries,
except that after 2008, the rising trend was not as smooth as that of ECOWAS
region.
Noting this seemingly ‘success story’ for ECOWAS countries, the extent to
which the manufacturing sector contribute to the GDP of these countries is still
minimal. For the period 1995–2012, the manufacturing sector contributed below
10 % to the GDP and this trend is decreasing by the year, except for 2012 as
depicted Table 1. Other African countries in the SSA region also witnessed similar
modicum contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP, at-least when compar-
ing both regions with the average of countries from other regions of the world as
displayed in Table 1. For instance, countries in East Asia and Pacific (EAP)—such
as China and Malaysia—experienced a whooping contribution of the manufactur-
ing sector to their economy with rates above 20 % for most of the period. Likewise,
countries in Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC), and South Asia (SA) all had manufacturing sector contributions rate of
about 15 % or more in most of the period presented in the table.
The trifling contribution of the manufacturing sector of ECOWAS countries and
countries in SSA to the overall economy reflects the performance of these countries
in manufacturing export. As displayed in Fig. 2, the manufacturing sector in
ECOWAS and SSA countries, are able to account for between 20 and 30 % of
the total merchandise export. This rate is far below the global average that was
consistently within the range of about 70 %. The manufacturing sector in countries
Fig. 1 Manufacturing value added annual growth rate. Source: Authors’ computation fromWorld
Bank (2013)
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in East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia and South Asia exported way
above 70 % of the total merchandise export.
To be exact, not only have the manufacturing sectors of countries in these
regions performed below the world average, they have experienced decreasing
trend in terms of percentage of manufacturing export to total merchandise export.
For instance, the percentage dropped from 26.39 % in 2005 to 20.64 % in 2012,
after it increased from 19.44 in 1999. Of course, the manufacturing export in SSA
countries also dropped from 29.84 % in 2005 to 25.75 % in 2012, after it increased
from 25.61 % in 1999. No wonder the sea port of countries in this region have
Table 1 Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)
1995–
1999
2000–
2004
2005–
2009 2010 2011 2012
East Asia and Pacific—EAP 24.271 23.203 22.991 22.969 22.370 19.224
Europe and Central Asia—
ECA
19.347 17.572 15.959 15.117 15.168 14.824
Latin America and Carib-
bean—LAC
18.646 18.436 17.349 16.753 16.300 15.228
South Asia—SA 15.862 15.136 15.647 14.852 14.870 14.344
Sub-Saharan Africa—SSA 13.558 13.076 11.695 10.941 10.340 9.835
ECOWAS 9.031 8.040 7.366 7.135 7.090 8.451
World 19.107 17.792 16.697 16.188 16.100 NA
Note: The region—Middle East and North Africa—was not included due to data unavailability for
the period considered
Source: Computations from World Bank (2013)
Fig. 2 Manufacturing export as % of total merchandise export. Note: EAP East Asia and Pacific,
ECA Europe and Central Asia, SA South Asia, SSA Sub-Saharan Africa. Latin America and the
Caribbean and Middle East and North Africa were not included due to data unavailability for the
period. Source: Computations from World Bank (2013)
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experienced low traffic compared to those in other regions (see Table 2), reflecting
the low participation in international trade relative to the shipping activities in the
ports. As a matter of fact, much more less than 1 % of the total global flow of
containers from land to sea are to or from the sea ports of ECOWAS countries.
The poor infrastructural provision4 in this region (ECOWAS) cannot be denied
as a likely suspect (Table 3). Apart from policy submissions to this effect
(e.g. African Development Bank-ADB 2010a, b; World Bank 2013), the statistics
of some infrastructural indicators validates these claim. For instance, considering
the electric power consumption per capita—presented in the first segment of
Table 4—which measures the Kilo Watt per capita of electricity available for
public consumption, ECOWAS countries (and SSA at large) had a dismal statistics.
For the entire period, countries in these regions had a highest KWh per capita
consumption of about 223 (for ECOWAS) and 534 (for SSA). This is many folds
less than the global average KWh consumption and those countries in other regions
such as EAP, ECA, LAC and MENA.
In the same vein, in Table 4, the average total rail lines in ECOWAS region
dropped from 1,572.71 km in the period (1995–1999) to 630.50 km in 2013.
Comparably, the statistics for countries in the EAP region presents a dissimilar
trend. In the EAP region, the average rail lines increased from 276,655.75 to
374,221.00 km in similar period. The decreasing trend in the rail lines per km is
likely traceable to poor maintenance of the rails and in some cases, fund
mismanagement that would have been used to maintain the rails. For instance,
Nigeria recounts incidences of misappropriation of public fund that would have
hitherto improved public infrastructure. Recently, railway staffs of the Nigerian
Railway Corporation were indicted for fraud that is worth over US$6 million
(PM News 2014).
Likewise, the road and ICT (internet) infrastructure in ECOWAS and other SSA
countries is still below the world average. In frantic, compared to other regions of
the world such as the EAP, ECA, LAC andMENA, countries in ECOWAS and SSA
region are many folds below the average infrastructural development obtainable.
Table 2 Container (20 foot equivalent units) Port Traffic
1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010 2011 2012
EAP – 50.83 52.00 52.98 53.70 54.12
ECA – 21.06 19.24 17.44 17.50 17.32
LAC – 6.55 6.77 7.40 7.15 7.17
MENA – 0.00 5.32 8.58 8.61 8.55
SA – 2.35 2.87 3.20 3.09 3.01
ECOWAS – 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Note: The region—SSA was not included due to data unavailability for the period considered
Source: Computations from World Bank (2013)
4Other measure of infrastructure (Logistic Performance Index) was presented in Table 3.
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However, there is need to emphasise that ECOWAS region records an impressive
road network compared to other regions in Africa. From Table 4, we observe that
the ECOWAS region had an average paved road network ranging from 19.12 to
35.50 % of the total roads, while those in other SSA countries ranged from 15.61 to
17.96 %.
Not beguiled by the seemingly impressive performance of ECOWAS countries
compared to other sub-regions in Africa—in relation to some infrastructural pro-
visions—the poor performance of the manufacturing sector of African countries in
general (including ECOWAS countries) raises serious concerns. In this study, the
poor institutional development in this region is ascribed as a likely culprit. The
statistics for the indicators of institutions—as reported by the World Governance
Indicators—and as displayed in Table 5 does not deny this fact. As it is, countries in
ECOWAS region and SSA (at large), recorded lower scores for the control of
corruption and government effectiveness. Although in regulatory quality measures,
the performance of these countries in relation to those in other regions of the world,
is kind of murky.
Emphasis is placed on the control of corruption and government effectiveness
because of the significant role they play in the improvement of infrastructural
facility. Considering the control of corruption, it measures the extent to which
public offices are exercised for private gains—including both petty and grand forms
of corruption—and other forms of “capture” of the state by elites and private
interests (World Bank 2013). It also measures the strength and effectiveness of a
country’s policy and institutional framework that are put in place to prevent and
combat corruption. On the other hand, government effectiveness captures the
Table 3 Logistics
performance index on quality
of trade and transportation
and related infrastructure
2007 2010 2012
Benin 1.89 2.48 2.57
Burkina Faso 1.89 1.89 2.40
Cape Verde NA NA NA
Cote D’Ivoire 2.22 2.37 2.31
Gambia 2.33 2.17 2.19
Ghana 2.25 2.52 2.05
Guinea 2.33 2.10 2.34
Guinea Bissau 2.25 1.56 2.68
Liberia 2.14 2.00 2.41
Mali 1.90 2.00 2.00
Niger 1.40 2.28 2.45
Nigeria 2.23 2.43 2.27
Senegal 2.23 2.43 2.27
Sierra Leone 2.09 2.64 2.31
Togo 1.83 1.61 2.50
ECOWAS 2.07 2.18 2.34
World average 2.58 2.64 2.76
Source: Authors’ compilation from World Trade Indicators
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quality of the public services, the civil service and its independence from political
pressures. Likewise, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to its stated policies, is also indicative
of the extent of government effectiveness. These two measures, in some form, are
expected to affect the extent of infrastructural development. Pathetically, the
performance of countries in ECOWAS and SSA were not impressive (see further
description in Table 6).
4 Empirical Strategy
The basic empirical model that underpins this relationship takes its clue from the
empirical model Sekkat and Varoudakis (2000) that was applied in Meon and
Sekkat (2008), which assumes that the exports of manufacturers are explained by
the following relationship:
log Xitð Þ ¼ α0i þ α1:log Eitð Þ þ α2:RYPit þ α3:log Iit1ð Þ þ μit ð1Þ
Where the main explained variable is the ratio of exports to GDP for the relevant
year (Xit), while the explanatory variables include the real effective exchange rate
(Eit) that captures the countries’ currency appreciation/depreciation. The other
Table 6 Institutional quality of ECOWAS countries
Control of corruption
Government
effectiveness Rule of law
2001–2005 2006–2010 2001–2005 2006–2010 2001–2005 2006–2010
Benin 0.664 0.614 0.393 0.522 0.462 0.625
Burkina Faso 0.088 0.354 0.616 0.621 0.598 0.314
Cape Verde 0.283 0.746 0.042 0.098 0.309 0.508
Cote D’Ivoire 0.987 1.119 1.089 1.234 1.390 1.379
Gambia 0.496 0.677 0.560 0.664 0.167 0.372
Ghana 0.236 0.033 0.121 0.009 0.044 0.044
Guinea 0.774 1.138 0.896 1.194 1.221 1.493
Guinea Bissau 1.026 1.078 1.279 1.079 1.248 1.348
Liberia 3.032 0.630 3.954 1.563 4.369 1.289
Mali 0.527 0.509 0.676 0.815 0.224 0.341
Niger 0.921 0.731 0.839 0.811 0.779 0.654
Nigeria 1.248 0.970 0.955 1.069 1.380 1.145
Senegal 0.006 0.552 0.157 0.366 0.012 0.311
Sierra Leone 0.908 0.915 1.333 1.181 1.273 0.980
Togo 0.810 0.991 1.452 1.469 0.943 0.894
Note: The three measures are valued from 2.5 (weak institutions) to +2.5 (strong institutions)
Source: Authors’ computations from World Governance Indicators (World Bank 2013)
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variables include the GDP growth rate of country ‘i’s’ partners (RYP) and the lag of
investment in the relevant sector over GDP (Iit-1).
Noting that the empirical model of Sekkat and Varoudakis (2000) closely relates
to the thesis of this study, we apply this model in this study by including some of
their covariates and our main variables of interest. In this study, we are interested in
the infrastructural provision and the interactive variable with institutions. The
covariates—from Sekkat and Varoudakis’ model—that is relevant to this study
are the exchange rate and investment. The main reason for the choice of these
covariates include the fact that exchange rate will reflect the relevant price for trade
as an increase in the exchange rate will mean an appreciation of the exporter’s
currency and this will have a negative effect on trade. Likewise, the inclusion of
investment variable is based on the grounded assumption that investment will
improve manufacturing output and consequently, trade (Liu et al. 2001, 2002;
Makki and Somwaru 2004).
Therefore, the empirical model for this study is presented as:
log Xitð Þ ¼ α0i þ α1:log Eitð Þ þ α2:log Iit1ð Þ þ α3:Infrasit þ α4:Instit
þ α5:Infras Instit þ μit ð2Þ
It is expected that infrastructure ‘Infras’ and institution ‘Inst’ will have a positive
effect on manufacturing export. This—in no gainsay—is expected due to the role of
infrastructure and institution on export (Meon and Sekkat 2008; Cissokho
et al. 2013). The main focus of this study is the behavior of the interactive variable
‘Infras Instit ’, which presents the multiplicative between institutions and infra-
structural provision. A positive variable connote that the improvement of institution
will improve infrastructural provision that affects growth. In essence, the compli-
mentary effect is being portrayed by a positive sign. On the contrary, a negative sign
connote that our argument is flawed and the relationship between the variables is
substitutive.
4.1 Variable Definition and Source
The variables that was included in the model [Eq. (2)] are defined in Table 7 and the
sources were also presented.
4.2 Method of Analysis
To ensure that the estimated results are not spurious, alternative econometric
methods was applied in the estimation. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regres-
sion will be applied in the estimation. Noting the issues—like heteroscedasticity
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and autocorrelations—related with the OLS technique, the Feasible Generalised
Least Square (FGLS) technique was also applied because it allows for the presence
of heteroscedasticity across the sampled countries and autocorrelation within the
panels. This provides for panel-corrected standard errors. These two approaches
will be relevant for sensitivity checks. As a matter of importance, the Systems type
of GMM estimation technique, which has been favoured by some studies like
Asiedu and Lien (2011); Asongu (2014). The uniqueness of the SGMM technique
is that it uses internally generated instruments to addresses issues of endogeneity
(Blundell and Bond 1998, 2000). For the SGMM technique to be relied upon, it is
expected that the test for autocorrelation AR (2) and the Sargan test for instrument
over-identification must be 0.05.
The SGMM equation type for Eq. (2) is as follows:
log Xitð Þ ¼ αlog Xit1ð Þ þ α1:log Eitð Þ þ α2:log Iit1ð Þ þ α3:Infrasit þ α4:Instit
þ α5:Infras Instit þ ηi þ εi ð3Þ
The other variables are as earlier defined and the lag of the explained variable has
‘α’ coefficient. The variable ‘η’ is the unobserved country-specific effects and the
error term is ‘εi’.
Table 7 Variables definition and source
Variable Identifier Definition Source
Manufacturing
export
Xit Manufacturing export, measured as percentage of mer-
chandise export
WDI
Exchange rate Eit Real exchange rate WDI
Investment Iit-1 We applied the growth rate of the manufacturing value
added as a proxy for the extent of investment in the
manufacturing sector. Gross fixed capital formation as a
percentage of GDP would have being used but this is
more generic
WDI
Infrastructure Infrasit Measured as the average of internet users per 100 per-
sons, mobile and fixed line telephone subscribers per
100 persons, and telephone users per 100 persons
WDI
Institutions Instit Corruption (CC) is the extent of corruption and the
extent to which public offices are misused for private
gains; Government Effectiveness (GE) captures the
quality of government policies and the commitment of
the government to such policies
WGI
Note: The institutional variables are standardized on a scale from 2.5 (weakest institutions) to
+2.5 (strongest institutions). WDI World Development Indicators, WGI World Governance
Indicators
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4.3 Sample
The 15 ECOWAS countries were included for the period 2000-2012. The sampled
countries include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Togo. The period chosen was based on data availability for the chosen
variables.
5 Juxtaposing the Relationship: Atleast for ECOWAS
The summary statistics of the main variables for ECOWAS countries are presented
in Table 8.
As a first check, the validity of the internal instruments that was used in the
SGMM, was considered. The checks are the Sargan and AR (2) test. Considering
the statistics of the two tests [Sargan and AR (2)], in all the columns in Table 9, the
instruments were valid and were not over-identified. This is following the p-values
of the test results. This confirmation renders the result from this study relevant and
reliable for inference.
To be concise, focus was only on the interactive variables (Control of
Corruption Infrastructure; Government Effectiveness Infrastructure) that
shows the juxtaposing between institutions, infrastructure and manufacturing
export. This results was displayed in the last segments of Table 9. The signs and
significant values of these interactive variables show that when considering the
development of institutions (i.e. corruption), infrastructure and manufacturing
export, we perceive that institutions and infrastructure play a substitutive role. As
a matter of fact, infrastructural development will impact less on manufacturing
export in countries where the control of corruption is improved. The coefficient of
this variable is ‘0.761’ and it is significant at 1 % level of significance.
This result contradicts the prediction in this paper as we expected that institu-
tions are complimentary factors in the infrastructure-manufacturing export nexus.
Put different, infrastructure development was expected to improve manufacturing
export in countries where the control of corruption is improved. Likewise, when
considering government effectiveness and the role it plays in the infrastructure-
manufacturing export nexus, we also perceive that infrastructure impacts less on
manufacturing export in countries where the government effectiveness is improved.
In essence, institutions play a substitutive role with infrastructure in influencing
manufacturing export. The coefficient of this variable is ‘0.552’ and it is signif-
icant at 10 % level of significance.
Faced with this somewhat contradiction, we raise a very important point: despite
the fact that institutional development is supposed to enhance the influence of
infrastructural development on manufacturing export, the case of ECOWAS is
different. Possibly, mere institutional development is not enough to enhance
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infrastructural improvement for manufacturing export. As it is evidence from this
study, there are other undertones that affect the expected result. We suspect that the
available structures to drive institutions are not readily available and so, institutions
are not able to achieve its objective of complementarity. In most developing
countries—for which ECOWAS is no exception—institutions are measured by
the policies that shows government’s objective in reducing corruption and enhanc-
ing their effectiveness (see Henry and Miller 2008). Not to forget, the measures of
Table 8 Summary statistics of variables
Description of variables Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
Mafex Ratio of manufacturing export to total
merchandise export
25.85 21.33 0.08 95.68
Magr Manufacturing value added 8.16 4.73 2.24 21.68
Exch Real exchange rate 793.09 1,161.88 0.54 6,658.03
Infra Indicator of infrastructural provision 10.58 10.80 0.08 44.27
CC Control of corruption (an indicator of
institutions)
0.60 0.48 1.37 0.80
GE Government effectiveness (an indicator of
institution)
0.79 0.49 1.84 0.33
Source: Authors’ computation
Table 9 SGMM results (dependent variable: manufacturing exports)
1 2 3 4
Manufacturing exports (1) 0.381*
(0.000)
0.364*
(0.000)
0.373*
(0.000)
0.350*
(0.000)
Manufacturing value added 0.564**
(0.025)
0.453***
(0.073)
0.585**
(0.018)
0.544**
(0.032)
Real exchange rate 0.245
(0.347)
0.250
(0.337)
0.101
(0.698)
0.1458
(0.549)
Infrastructure 0.103
(0.325)
0.291***
(0.095)
0.120
(0.252)
0.190
(0.327)
Control of corruption 1.887
(0.487)
8.971**
(0.016)
Control of corruption infrastructure 0.761*
(0.005)
Government effectiveness 4.124
(0.140)
1.340
(0.741)
Government effectiveness infrastructure 0.552***
(0.058)
Constant 9.152
(0.016)
14.465
(0.001)
5.460
(0.148)
9.968
(0.028)
AR (1) 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001
AR (2) 0.657 0.718 0.639 0.647
Sargan test 0.393 0.568 0.435 0.473
Note: The values in parenthesis are the probability values
*, **, *** are the significant levels of 1, 5 and 10 % levels of significance
Manufacturing Export, Infrastructure and Institutions: Reflections from ECOWAS 173
pecos4eva@gmail.com
institutions (control of corruption and Government effectiveness) are based on the
perception of some groups, whose opinions are not distant from the public policies
that support institutional growth. Like Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) observed in
their blog on “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, prosperity and Poverty”,
institutions should go beyond policies and focus on structures that constraint,
enhance and facilitate the application of policies. Most likely, ECOWAS countries
are lacking in this regard and that’s why the measures of institutions are not in sync
with the improvement of infrastructure for enhanced manufacturing export.
Another important undertone is the ‘power’ of public officers who are supposed
to enforce public policies. In African countries and ECOWAS, we find public
officers who are very powerful and most times, they use their power to inform the
dictates of public policies (Jo-Ansie 2007). In situations like this, it is expected that
institutional development will most likely not achieve its objective. In this case, the
submission of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that institutions should create a
structure that drives incentives for the implementation of policies and in the case of
Africa, create a cost for non-compliance. The situation in Africa is that: it is not as if
cost and incentives are not embedded in the institutional structures, but such
structures are not compelling to curtail excessiveness of public officers. Probably,
the regional community can begin to play oversight to check public officers’
compliance with institutional dictates.
5.1 Sensitivity Checks
The first sensitivity check is to ascertain the consistency of the result when
excluding Nigeria from the sample of this study. The main reason for this is due
to the economic size of Nigeria in the region. As it is, Nigeria’s economic size is
more than 57 % of the entire ECOWAS’ economy (World Bank 2010) and this
imply that their presence in the composition of the sample will likely influence the
result. However, the result in Table 10 contradicts this expectation and it was
obvious that—irrespective of the inclusion or exclusion of Nigeria, the interactive
variable was signed similarly. In the last rows of the table, the behaviour of the
interactive variables (Corruption Infrastructure; Government Effective-
ness Infrastructure) was negative in all the columns. This further validates our
earlier findings and submissions.
The second sensitivity check is to confirm whether the interactive variable still
maintains its signs—as it is in the earlier Table 10—by checking the effect of
alternative estimation technique and measures of investment. The alternative esti-
mation technique is the use of OLS and FGLS; and instead of using the manufactur-
ing value added, the gross fixed capital formation was used. The essence of the
Feasible Generalised Least Square (FGLS) technique was applied because it allows
for the presence of heteroscedasticity across the sampled countries and autocorre-
lation within the panels. This provides panel-corrected standard errors estimates.
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The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was included as a complementary
estimation technique.
The result from this analysis presents the same sign for the interactive variables.
As it is, column 1–4 of Table 11, where the alternative estimation technique was
used for the baseline model that was estimated in Table 10, still presents negative
signs. In essence, the stance that institutions in ECOWAS countries do not play a
complimentary role in the infrastructure-manufacturing export nexus is valid and
not informed by the estimation technique applied in reaching such conclusions.
In the same Table 11, the fifth to the eighth Column present a scenario where an
alternative measure of investment and estimation technique was used. In these
columns, the main variable of interest (Infrastructure Institution) still maintains
its negative sign and significant in all the columns. We can re-emphasise at this
point that irrespective of the covariate applied (especially with regards to the
measure of investment), the interactive variable still maintains its negative sign.
5.2 Conclusion
The main result from this study is that: contradictorily, institutions in ECOWAS
countries do not play a complementary role to infrastructural development for
improved manufacturing export. This result is robust, despite the alternative
Table 10 SGMM results excluding Nigeria
1 2 3 4
Manufacturing exports (1) 0.376*
(0.000)
0.363*
(0.000)
0.369*
(0.000)
0.343*
(0.000)
Manufacturing value added ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Exchange rate ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Infrastructure ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Corruption ✓ ✓
Corruption Infrastructure 0.733***
(0.009)
Government effectiveness ✓ ✓
Government effectiveness infrastructure 0.514***
(0.083)
Constant 10.274
(0.010)
14.647
(0.001)
6.988
(0.082)
11.102
(0.018)
AR (1) 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.002
AR (2) 0.655 0.714 0.644 0.649
Sargan test 0.471 0.633 0.494 0.555
Note: The values in parenthesis are the probability values. The sign ‘✓’ imply that the variables
were included in the estimated model. When this sign is not included, it imply that the variable was
not included
*, **, *** are the significant levels of 1, 5 and 10 % levels of significance
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estimations. In the light of this finding, two main issues were identified as possible
reasons for this contradictory result: the unavailability of structures that drive
institutions may be a possible cause and the powerfulness of public officers who
are supposed to enforce public policies.
Based on this finding, it is recommended that ECOWAS—as a regional eco-
nomic community—can begin to play a supervisory role for countries in the
community. By supervisory role, we imply that despite the ‘beautiful’ policies
made by countries to forestall institutional development, there is the need for
ECOWAS to ensure that related public officers adhere to the enforcement of such
policies. Apart from this, the regional community can begin to develop frameworks
that put public officers in member countries to check the applicability of member
countries’ policies. The reason for this policy recommendation is that; ECOWAS
countries are not lacking in the development of policies—that shows institutional
development—but the political will to put in place structures that ensures the
accomplishment of the policies is probably not sufficient to enhance its effect.
Therefore the regional community can act as a monitoring/enforcing body.
Just like it is obtainable in most empirical studies, we identified an area for future
studies: that is, future empirical studies can focus on the consistency of our result
when other measures of infrastructure are applied in our empirical model. The
realisation of such study will be faced with data constraint in terms of macro-
economic data that reflects infrastructural development in African countries. If this
constraint is mitigated, then a robust result will be necessary to check the consis-
tency of the findings of this study.
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